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The Engine of 'Europeanness'?  
Free Movement, Social Transnationalism and European 
Identification 
 
I The Spatial Bases of European Identification 
One of the things that Brexit proved is that Europe’s root problem is Europeans’ self-
identification. It is not by chance that the only (or the first?) country that has seceded from 
the EU is the UK. For decades, Britons have scored on top of Eurobarometer as the EU 
citizens least willing to call themselves ‘European’. Collective identification matters. A 
poor sense of Europeanness means no solidarity with other Europeans. No solidarity 
translates into little public support to European institutions when they endeavour to 
impose redistributive policies or to pool member states’ resources. An appeal to German 
taxpayers to pay off the Greeks’ debts cannot leverage – as happened after reunification 
of the two Germanies – a strong bond between the two populations. There is no financial 
alchemy or constitutional engineering able to remedy this basic flaw of European 
integration. 
What can make Europeans feel ‘European’? What can bind them to a political-territorial 
community that was created top-down and only relatively recently? Historically, when 
nation states took up the challenge of nation-building, they used the instruments of 
compulsory conscription, mass education (in particular the teaching of history and 
geography), explicit propaganda (especially in times of crisis), and ‘banal nationalism’ 
expressed through widespread symbols and implicit fictions.1 Today, compulsory 
military service has been discontinued by almost all the EU member states (with a few 
after-thoughts), so that implementing it on a continental scale would hardly be feasible. 
As regards education, a history of Europe purged of nationalistic biases was proposed by 
scholars from different countries. But limited use has been made of these textbooks, 
which tend to be hostage of national controversies about key historical characters and 
                                                 
1 M Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, Sage, 1995). 
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events.2 As for propaganda, the European Commission has promoted a wide range of 
media campaigns, especially on the occasion of major changes such as introduction of the 
euro. Less episodically, it is this propagandistic purpose that lies behind many of EU’s 
cultural policies such as the designation of the ‘European Years’ or a European capital of 
culture.3 Last but not least, there is ‘banal Europeanism’ hinged on an array of different 
tools. Some of them have a deliberate identitarian connotation: the European flag, the 
European anthem, Europe Day (on the 9th of May, anniversary of the Schuman 
Declaration). Others were put in place for different purposes: for instance, the common 
currency or free movement rights. But have these policies had any effects on bolstering a 
European identity?  
In this paper, I concentrate on free movement, arguing that it has a very strong potential 
of fostering a sense of ‘Europeanness’. The starting point of my argument rests on psycho-
geographical knowledge, according to which humans are territorial beings. The 
localization of life-worlds nurtures a sense of spatial confidence that tends to turn into 
spatial attachment.4 Permanence in a physical context breeds adaptation, familiarity, and 
eventually an attachment to it. This, in turn, substantiates the taken-for-granted nature of 
its institutions, thus contributing to the legitimacy of on-going collective arrangements, 
including political ones.5 In other words, people’s inclination to be attached to the places 
where they spend or have spent their life – the places that constitute an individual’s 
‘space-set’6 – fits in with intentional activities of power-holders to demand legitimacy for 
the existing political order inasmuch as such order coincides geographically with the 
subjects’ (or citizens’) space-set. Concretely, loyalty to a given country is higher if people 
have a first-hand experience of that country’s territory (and especially of symbolically 
core places). One of the latent functions of conscription has always been to socialize youth 
                                                 
2 S Immerfall, K Boehnke and D Baier, 'Identity' in S Immerfall and G Therborn (eds), Handbook of 
European Societies, 2nd edn (New York, Springer, 2010) 325, 345ff. 
3 M Sassatelli, 'Imagined Europe: The Shaping of a European Cultural Identity through EU Cultural Policy' 
(2002) 5 European Journal of Social Theory 435. 
4 YF Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 
1977); RD Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1986); J Lévy, Lespace légitime. Sur la dimension géographique de la fonction politique (Paris, Presses de 
la FNSP, 1994); A Moles and E Rohmer, Psychosociologie de l’espace (Paris, L’Harmattan, 1998). 
5 H Popitz, Phenomena of Power. Authority, Domination, and Violence (New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2017 [1986]) chapter 2. 
6 E Recchi, 'Space, Mobility and Legitimacy' in WR Thompson (ed), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of 
Politics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016); E Recchi and T Kuhn, 'Europeans’ Space-Sets and the 
Political Legitimacy of the EU' in N Kauppi (ed), A Political Sociology of Transnational Europe 
(Colchester, ECPR Press, 2013). 
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to different regions of ‘their’ nation. Internal migration yields a similar effect. Although 
some may fear it can erode community bonds7, in fact it spreads out the sense of belonging 
to a larger spatial unit – the nation. The US and Chinese instances – where internal 
migration is robust as well as national identification – are cases in point. 
According to this logic, in contemporary Europe the free movement regime should 
facilitate the same outcome on a transnational scale. Albeit with different underlying (and 
not entirely explicit) theoretical premises, indeed such insight sits well with Karl 
Deutsch’s ‘transactionalist thesis’ on European integration. The thesis is an upshot of 
Deutsch’s earlier theory of nationalism.8 In his view, nation-building comes about mainly 
through the construction of ‘infrastructures’ which facilitate economic and social 
exchanges within territorial boundaries. Infrastructures create ‘societies’, while 
communication and culture create ‘communities’. But the latter cannot exist without the 
former. The sense of belonging to a nation grows out of the intensification of social 
relations within it. In a nation-centered world, co-nationals interact with each other more 
than they do with people external to the nation, thereby strengthening their sense of 
solidarity and common destiny. Once people start to communicate regularly and cluster 
across national borders, however, their spatially-bounded connections trigger a 
reconfiguration of collective attachments. Deutsch accordingly notes that ‘boundaries are 
not just lines on a map […] what really makes a boundary is a sharp drop in the frequency 
of some relevant transaction flow’.9 As in the case of incipient nations, the expansion of 
economic, social and cultural exchanges across the boundaries of pre-existing polities is 
expected to lead to the formation of ‘security communities’ – one of which was the 
newborn European Economic Community, which Deutsch held could progressively 
endow itself with a collective identity through increased transnational interactions.10  
 
II Assessing the ‘Free Movement’ Effect 
                                                 
7 RD Putman, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York, Simon and 
Schuster, 2000). 
8 KW Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality 
(Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 1953). 
9 KW Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alternatives (New York, Knopf, 1969) 97. 
10 KW Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the 
Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957). 
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In the previous section, I sketched out two converging but theoretically distinct 
hypotheses. The first one drew on psycho-geographical tenets to claim that individuals 
with personal experiences of life in different European countries are expected to be more 
prone to see themselves as ‘European’. EU citizens who have moved to another member 
state under the aegis of the free movement regime belong to such possibly more pro-
Europe population. To test the hypothesis, I will use original survey data collected in 2004 
and 2010 on intra-EU migrants and pool them with Eurobarometer data on the general, 
immobile population of nationals of each EU country. Statistical analysis, in the form of 
logistic regressions, will control whether – ceteris paribus – ‘EU movers’ are more likely 
to feel attached to Europe than ‘EU stayers’.11 The second hypothesis drew on Karl 
Deutsch’s argument of the effect of cross-border activities on individual outlooks: the 
more people engage in transnational practices, the more they are likely to adopt a 
supranational identification. To test the hypothesis, I will rely on data from 
Eurobarometer 73 of 2010 that record a list of ten possible individual cross-border 
behaviours (from watching foreign tv to travelling abroad: see below). Multilevel logistic 
regression will control whether the more people act transnationally, the more they feel 
attached to Europe. 
To begin with, I will present the analyses which compare the sense of belonging to Europe 
between movers and stayers. A key point to bear in mind is that EU movers form a small 
fraction of Europeans. EU citizens resident in another member state hover around 3 per 
cent of the total population.12 This makes it impracticable to study their characteristics, 
behaviours, and attitudes using data from sample surveys conducted with random criteria 
on the entire population: even in large-scale surveys, the absolute number of sampled 
cases would be rather modest. A solution is to combine data from population surveys with 
data from ad hoc surveys on migrants that deal with the same phenomena using the same 
indicators. This is the strategy adopted here, by merging Eurobarometer data with data 
from the European Internal Movers’ Social Survey (EIMSS) and Moveact surveys, which 
                                                 
11 A methodological caveat is in order: cross-sectional survey data (that is, collected at one particular time) 
cannot be used to establish conclusively whether this possible difference is due directly to the experience 
of mobility or to other factors that preceded it. Only longitudinal information collected before and after 
migration would settle the question. However, there are theoretical reasons (illustrated in the previous 
section) that do justify the expectation that the experience of cross-border mobility fosters supranational 
identifications rather than the other way around. 
12 E Recchi, Mobile Europe. The Theory and Practice of Free Movement in the EU (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015) 52ff. 
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were designed to make this operation possible.13 More specifically, I constructed a first 
joint matrix relative to 2004 with data from Eurobarometer 62 and the EIMSS survey on 
German, British, French, Spanish and Italian nationals. The second matrix has 2010-2011 
as its temporal reference, and pools data from Eurobarometer 73 of 2010 with data from 
the 2011 Moveact survey on citizens of German, British, Polish and Romanian 
nationality.14 It is thus possible to compare – amongst other things – the sense of 
identification with Europe of the stayers and movers of different countries at two distant 
moments of time. 
 
 
Figure 1. Feeling European: EU movers and stayers who declare themselves to be ‘very 





















                                                 
13 Recchi (note 12) 155-157. 
14 None of the 2011 Eurobarometers contain the dependent variable common to all the other surveys: the 
question on ‘attachment to Europe’. I therefore had to rely on the survey closest in time able to ensure full 
comparability: the Eurobarometer 73.3 of March-April 2010. Moreover, to be precise, in the latter survey 
the response item was not phrased as ‘Europe’ but rather as the ‘European Union’. This is an unfortunate 
change which must be factored in, but – also in consideration of the question structure, which is for the rest 
unaltered – I assume it to be an analogously trustworthy measurement of the European component of 
identification. 
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Both surveys show that European citizens who feel ‘very attached’ to Europe are 
proportionally more numerous among those living in another member state than in the 
rest of the population (Figure 1). This is also the case within each nationality examined, 
independently of its level of identification with Europe. In absolute terms, in 2004, the 
Spanish respondents, both stayers and movers, accounted for the largest proportion of 
convinced Europeans. In 2010-11, across a different range of nationalities, the highest 
level of European identification was expressed by Germans among mobile citizens and 
Poles among non-mobile ones. Not surprisingly (especially ex post), in both 2004 and 
2010-11, British respondents recorded the lowest levels of attachment to Europe. In the 
more recent survey, the percentage of Romanians who expressed a strong attachment to 
Europe was almost equally low (16.7 per cent among movers and 9.3 per cent among 
stayers). But there are no exceptions to the rule that attachment to Europe is more 
widespread among mobile citizens. Moreover, among the nationalities for which it makes 
sense to conduct intertemporal comparison – German and British – a decrease in the 
proportion of respondents strongly attached to Europe is apparent among stayers but not 
among movers. Indeed, in the sample of Germans resident abroad in 2011, 41 per cent of 
respondents were very attached to Europe.  
 
 
Table 1. Determinants of attachment to Europe in 2004 and 2010-11: logit regressions 
(‘very attached’ vs. ‘fairly, not very or not at all attached’) 
 
  2004  2010-11  
    
Intra-EU mobility 1.734 ** 3.857 ** 
Age (ref: >60 yrs old)   
             15-30 .781 * .942  







Sources: 2004: Eurobarometer 62 and EIMSS: N=9,254; df=19; chi-square=3852.56; Nagelkerke R2 =,18. 
2010-11: Eurobarometer 73 and Moveact: N=6,344; df=17; chi-square=1916.80; Nagelkerke R2 =.17. Note: 
* p<.05, ** p<.01. Coefficients are odds ratios. 
 
 
Of course, this preliminary analysis yields only inconclusive findings, given that the 
difference between movers and stayers may also be due to the differing composition of 
the samples. To neutralize this possibility, I conducted multivariate analyses which 
             41-50 .905  .803  
             51-60 1.112  .905  
Gender (=woman)  .732 ** .827 * 
Education (ref: Low, up to 15) 







             High (after 19) 2.032 ** 1.751 ** 
Social class (ref: EGP VII) 






             EGP III 1.167  .852  
             EGP IV 1.189  1.127  
             EGP V-VI 1.042  .827  
Nationality (ref: German)  




             British .472 ** .368 ** 
             Spanish 
             Italian 
             Polish 













Local identification 1.041  1.259 * 
Regional identification 3.324 ** -  
National identification 2.182 ** 2.691 ** 
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control for the simultaneous effect of the main sociological factors that can influence the 
level of European identification. Table 1 presents the results of two logistic regression 
models of such factors on the dichotomous dependent variable described in Figure 6.1: 
that is, self-definition or otherwise as ‘very attached to Europe’.15 The first model refers 
to the 2004 sample (consisting of the Eb62 and EIMSS data), the second to the 2010-11 
sample (consisting of Eb73 and Moveact data). In both cases, experiencing intra-EU 
mobility is one of the strongest predictors of attachment to Europe. In 2011, in fact, 
assuming the overall combination of the reference modalities of the control variables 
introduced into the model, mobility is associated with four times higher odds of feeling 
‘very attached’ to Europe, standing out as the single most powerful independent variable 
of the model. As to be expected, education – in particular, up to tertiary level (that is, after 
the age of 19) – tends to engender a greater sense of Europeanness as well. By contrast, 
upper class membership is significant in the first but not the second model. Likewise, 
whilst in the first model attachment to Europe was significantly lower among 
interviewees in the younger age groups, this is not the case in the 2010-11 surveys. Gender 
differences are in line with most of the literature: men are more inclined to describe 
themselves as European.16  
Unfortunately, the two datasets do not contain data relative to values and political 
attitudes that might be important (for instance, self-placement on the right-left scale).17 
But information regarding the other competing political-territorial identities is indeed 
available. Analysis reveals that strong regional and national identities – to which local 
ones were also added in 2011 – are associated with attachment to Europe. This may be 
                                                 
15 Caution is needed when interpreting parameters of logistic regressions conducted on different samples, 
see: C Mood, 'Logistic Regression: Why We Cannot Do What We Think We Can Do, and What We Can 
Do About It' (2010) 26 European Sociological Review 67. As long as it cannot be assumed that unobserved 
heterogeneity is the same across such samples, effects cannot be compared properly. In this light, the two 
models examined here (and in following analyses of this chapter) must be read as two parallel takes on the 
issue rather than a way to gauge changes in the influence of only apparently comparable factors. 
16 B Nelson and J Guth, 'Exploring the Gender Gap: Women, Men and Public Attitudes toward European 
Integration' (2000) 1 European Union Politics 267; J Citrin and J Sides, 'More than Nationals: How Identity 
Choice Matters in the New Europe' in RK Herrmann, T Risse and MB Brewer (eds), Transnational 
Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); T Risse, A 
Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 
2010). 
17 An emphasis on the pro-Europe impact of cross-border mobility and transnational behaviours should not 
blind us to socialization effects: a recent study on EU-oriented solidarity attests that these two types of 
antecedents tend to interact, see: I Ciornei and E Recchi, 'At the Source of European Solidarity: Assessing 
the Effects of Cross-border Practices and Political Attitudes' (2017) JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12507.  
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the substantive expression of a sensibility underlying the collective dimension of social 
life in its territorial variants. More prosaically, however, not to be excluded is the presence 
of a ‘response set’ which reduces the discriminatory capacity of these indicators. Finally, 
British origin is correlated negatively – and considerably so – with European 
identification in both surveys. It is especially negative in comparison with the reference 
category – German nationality – which is significantly associated with an attachment to 
Europe greater than that of the other nationalities in 2010-11, but not in 2004, when a 
more marked effect was exerted by Spanish and Italian origin (the latter with a non-
significant statistical difference).  
 
In sum, European citizens who move from one EU member state to another feel more 
European than their peers who spend their lives within the boundaries of their country of 
birth.18 But freedom of movement does not exhaust the opportunities for interaction 
across national borders created by European integration and, simultaneously, 
globalization. Mobility is only one of a broad set of transnational behaviours that can spill 
over into a stronger European identity. Eurobarometer 73 provides an opportunity to track 
down a large palette of transnational practices among Europeans, as it contains a series 
of dichotomous items on the basis of which I constructed an additive index of ‘individual 
transnationalism’. Indicators were divided into three categories – strong, moderate, and 
weak19 transnational behaviours – assigning them different weights in the index (15 per 
cent, 10 per cent, and 5 per cent): 
                                                 
18 Moreover, studies focusing on migrants in Europe indicate that intra-EU migrants tend to identify more 
with Europe than third-country nationals, (A Roeder, 'Does Mobility Matter for Attitudes to Europe? A 
Multi-level Analysis of Immigrants’ Attitudes to European Unification' (2011) 59 Political Studies 458; D 
Di Mauro and I Fiket, 'Discovering Europe? Identity of Migrants in the EU' in I Tarrósy, Á Tuka, Z Vörös 
and A Schmidt (eds), European Integration: Perspectives and Challenges: How ‘Borderless’ Is Europe? 
(Pécs, University of Pécs, 2014). Van Mol shows that the association between mobility experiences and 
European identification holds even in case of relatively short settlements, like Erasmus grants (lasting no 
more than 12 months), see: C Van Mol, Intra-European student mobility in international higher education 
circuits: Europe on the move (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2014). Finally, even among migrants (in the German 
case), it is found that ‘those who are spatially more mobile are those identifying the most as European’, see 
C Teney, L Hanquinet, and K Bürkin, 'Feeling European: an exploration of ethnic disparities among 
immigrants' (2016) 42 Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies 2182, 2193. 
19 This classification of transnational behaviours according to their intensity seems to be the best one 
possible given the indicators available in Eb73. In theoretical terms, I have elsewhere proposed a more 
composite classification which rests on a fundamental distinction between transnationalism practices which 
depend on physical mobility (long/brief residence abroad) and virtual mobility (personal/impersonal), see: 
E Recchi, 'Pathways to European Identity Formation: A Tale of Two Models' (2014) 27 Innovation: The 
European Journal of Social Science Research 119. Another classification distinguishes three dimensions 
of transnationalism relative to background, practices, and human capital, see: T Kuhn 'Individual 
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- Had worked abroad for more than three months (15 per cent); 
- Had studied abroad for more than three months (15 per cent); 
- Had lived abroad for more than three months (for reasons other than work or study) 
(15 per cent); 
- Had or had had a partner who was or had been a citizen of another country (15 per 
cent); 
- Normally spent holidays abroad (10 per cent); 
- Owned property abroad (10 per cent); 
- Had family members living abroad (5 per cent); 
- Had friends living abroad (5 per cent); 
- Regularly followed news about another country (5 per cent); 
- Regularly cooked typical dishes of another country (5 per cent). 
 
The index of individual transnationalism thus constructed varies from 0 (no transnational 
experience) to 20 (involvement in all transnational practices). Its distribution in the 
sample is, in fact, markedly unbalanced. Only 6.6 per cent of the interviewees record 
scores over 10, while fully 48.1 per cent record 2 (the median) or less. The average score 
is 3.04. Multivariate analysis20 confirms that people in the upper class, with higher 
educational qualifications, younger, male, and resident in large cities, were likely to have 
higher scores. Moreover, not surprisingly, transnationalism was found to be more 
widespread among people living in the richest and most globalized countries. 
 
 
Table 2. Mobility experiences, individual transnationalism and attachment to the EU in 
the EU population: multilevel logit regressions (‘very attached’ vs. ‘fairly, not very or not 
at all attached’) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
                                                 
Transnationalism, Globalisation and Euroscepticism: An Empirical Test of Deutsch’s Transactionalist 
Theory' (2011) 50 European Journal of Political Research 811, 814f. The human capital component is not 
strictly speaking a transnational behaviour, and remains thus outside the present analysis. At the same time, 
it is evident that knowledge of foreign languages is a sine qua non of individual transnationalism whose 
identitarian consequences deserve closer scrutiny, see: J Gerhards, From Babel to Brussels. European 
Integration and the Importance of Transnational Linguistic Capital (Berlin, Berlin Studies on the Sociology 
of Europe (BSSE) No. 28 Freie Universität Berlin, 2012). 
20 Not presented here: LG Baglioni and E Recchi, 'La classe media va in Europa? Transnazionalismo e 












Individual-level variables    
International mobility (≥ 3 months)   1.654 ***  
Individual transnationalism index     1.103 ***
Gender (=woman) .885 ** .902 * .896 * 
Age .986 * .983 * .978 ** 
Age (squared) 1.000  1.000  1.000  
Education (ref: Low, up to 15) 
              Middle (up to 16-19) 1.078  1.082  1.059  
              High (over 19) 1.496 *** 1.461 *** 1.339 ***
Social class (ref: Inactive)    
              Bourgeoisie (I) 1.408 ** .757 * .820  
              Salariat (II) .856  .899  .960  
              Routine white collar (III) 1.038  1.073  1.112  
              Petty bourgeoisie (IV) .855  .895  .932  
              Working class (V-VI-VII) 1.063  1.106  1.155  
Internet use (7 points scale) 1.068 *** 1.064 *** 1.048 ***
Local identification 1.347 *** 1.350 *** 1.340 ***
Region/county identification 1.808 *** 1.844 *** 1.916 ***
National identification 4.005 *** 4.084 *** 4.380 ***
Country level 
variables 
EU15 member state .736  .748  .824
Population (thousands) 1.000  1.000  1.000
Gdp per capita (thousands, $) 1.000  1.000  1.000
Unemployment rate 1.000  .998  .996
Globalization index (Kof) 1.004  1.004  1.005
Intercept  .017  .014  .013
   
Variance of random intercept .506  .513  .507
 12
Log-likelihood -7708.84  -7664.49  -7561.52
Wald chi-square  1184.82  1259.70  1414.60
 
Source: Eurobarometer 73 (2010). n= 26,582, N=27. 
Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Coefficients are odds ratios. 
 
 
Table 2 sets out the results of three multilevel logistic regression models used to test the 
hypothesis that international mobility and transnationalism influence the sense of 
belonging to the EU.21 The first model does not include the independent variables of 
interest – that is, the experience of international mobility (having lived abroad for more 
than three months) and the individual transnationalism index – so as to highlight their 
separate explanatory power.  
In general, multilevel models are used if it is believed that the parameters relative to the 
individual factors do not vary independently but according to patterns typical of the 
higher-order units – in the present case, countries. The analysis is thus able to account for 
a more complex variability compared with the non-hierarchical models employed 
previously, given the larger number of countries considered (the then 27 member states 
of the EU).22 It is also possible to control for a number of potentially significant context 
variables: in particular, the membership or otherwise of the residence country in the 
EU15, postulating that European identification is stronger the longer a country has been 
a member state of the EU;23 national demographic size, presuming that smaller states have 
a higher interest in European integration;24 per capita income and the unemployment rate, 
                                                 
21 Differently from previous models, in this analysis the ‘international mobility’ variable is not restricted to 
current mobility but also includes past experiences, and it is not limited to movements within the EU but 
to any possible foreign country. Moreover, the sample is the EU-wide Eurobarometer, and not a case-
control combination of two different surveys as before. All this provides an even stronger test of the 
mobility-supranational identity link. 
22 In the logistic regression models estimated previously, by contrast, the number of countries was too small 
to use hierarchical models, see MR Steenbergen and BS Jones, 'Modeling Multilevel Data Structures' 
(2002) 46 American Journal of Political Science 218, 219. Moreover, EU movers and stayers share 
nationality but not residence: therefore, a common dependence on the context would have been an 
unrealistic assumption. 
23 S Nissen, 'European Identity and the Future of Europe’ in M Bach, C Lahusen and G Vobruba (eds), 
Europe in Motion: Social Dynamics and Political Institutions in an Enlarging Europe (Berlin, Sigma, 
2005). 
24 R Steinmetz and A Wivel, Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities (Farnham, Ashgate, 
2010). 
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given the greater utility deriving to economically weaker countries from EU 
membership;25 and the country’s level of globalization (measured with the KOF index 
already used in the Introduction), on the assumption that societal openness to the global 
dimension creates a climate conducive to supranational identities.26  
None of the national-level variables included in the models proves significant. To single 
out the conditions under which a more solid European identification develops therefore 
requires shifting the focus to factors operating at the individual level. The model also 
includes an additional variable measuring the frequency of Internet use among the 
interviewees. Although not a direct expression of transnationalism (the web can be used 
to search for local information), the fact that this variable is significantly associated with 
a stronger attachment to the EU seems to bear out the central hypothesis that activities 
spanning over national borders foster a sense of supranational identification.  
This hypothesis is decidedly corroborated when the experience of (past or current) 
mobility abroad (model 2) and the individual transnationalism index (model 3) are 
introduced. The effect of each of these variables is markedly positive and significant. But 
that of transnationalism, including a range of practices wider than only sojourns in another 
country, is even stronger – when comparing the coefficients, consider that ‘mobility’ is a 
dichotomy, while the transnationalism index varies on a 20-points scale. It is also 
noteworthy that the model including the social transnationalism index has a better overall 
fit, but the significance of upper class membership and urban-metropolitan residence 
disappears. Moreover, once the social transnationalism index is introduced, the effect of 
education diminishes. It seems likely that in the first model the large part of class and 
education effects ‘incorporated’ transnationalism, which thus emerges as a more direct 
cause of supranational identification.  
 
Overall, evidence presented in this section resonates with other analyses carried out in 
parallel with different datasets and modelling. Examining Eurobarometer data relative to 
support for the EU and data relative to the transnational practices of Europeans, Fligstein 
                                                 
25 RC Eichenberg and RJ Dalton, 'Europeans and the European Union: the Dynamics of Public Support for 
European Integration' (1993) 47 International Organization 507; M Gabel and H Palmer, 'Understanding 
Variation in Public Support for European Integration' (1995) 27 European Journal of Political Research 3.  
26 JK Jung, 'Growing Supranational Identities in a Globalising World? A Multilevel Analysis of the World 
Values Surveys' (2008) 47 European Journal of Political Research 578; W Haller and V Roudometof, 'The 
Cosmopolitan-Local Continuum in a Cross-National Perspective' (2010) 46 Journal of Sociology 277. 
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noted that the same social categories – young people, more highly educated individuals, 
and members of the upper social strata – figure among the most pro-Europe and 
transnational citizens.27 However, because his analysis was conducted on separate data, 
he was unable to prove that the two phenomena were indeed associated (i.e., that the 
supporters of European integration and the Europeans with the most experience of 
mobility were the same people). A German pioneer study found that cross-border 
mobility and practices go hand in hand with cosmopolitan28  identification. Interestingly, 
another German study indicates that the transnationalism-cosmopolitanism association is 
stronger among ordinary citizens than it is in the elite.29 This probably reflects a ceiling 
effect, as the members of the elite are homogenously highly transnational.30  
The most powerful study on the transnationalism-Europeanness association is however 
Kuhn’s.31 Her point of departure is an apparent inconsistency: at the aggregate level, 
transnational contacts have proliferated in Europe since the 1970s, while support for 
European institutions has stagnated, with some trendless fluctuations. In fact, the 
transnationalism-European identification association is incontrovertible at the individual 
level, but it does not show up in aggregate terms because it is strongly stratified. In other 
words, the rise in the volume of transnational activities is disproportionately due to 
privileged social strata, a group that also expresses strong support for the EU. Kuhn’s 
analysis reveals that transnational practices (hinged on cross-border mobility) sustain 
European identification (and EU support) more than a transnational background and 
transnational human capital. Moreover, EU-based transnational practices affect pro-EU 
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migration experiences, and foreign friendships with a persistent focus on the issues, debates, and identities 
of the place of residence (M Savage et al, Globalisation and belonging (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004); 
A Andreotti, P Le Galès, and FJ Moreno-Fuentes, Globalised Minds, Roots in the City: Urban Upper-
middle Classes in Europe (Oxford, Wiley & Sons, 2014). 
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 15
attitudes more than experiences of transnationalism that are geographically anchored 
outside the European space. Finally, the transnationalism-EU identification association is 
accentuated in the most globalized European countries, where highly transnational 
individuals are more Europhile and ‘non-transnationals’ are more vigorously Euroskeptic, 
possibly feeling marginalized and threatened by European integration. 
 
III Conclusion 
Collective politico-territorial identification is a pre-condition for the legitimacy of any 
political order – and all the more so of democracies. The EU has suffered from this 
legitimacy deficit since long. Is free movement an antidote to such inherent fragility? And 
what about cross-national practices that do not imply population resettlement but make 
nonetheless people move physically or culturally from one country to another? In the 
theoretical section of this chapter (§ 1), I have mobilized existing literature to argue that 
intra-EU migration and individual transnationalism are likely predictors of enhanced 
identification with Europe. In the empirical section (§ 2), I have shown that mass surveys 
– some of which analyzed in greater detail – corroborate such theoretical expectations.  
However, these findings must be placed in perspective: Intra-EU mobility and individual 
transnationalism remain minority phenomena and this puts a brake to their culturally 
integrating effects, in two senses. First, demographically individuals who have an 
opportunity to enlarge their ‘space-sets’ to a EU-wide scale are still a tiny proportion of 
the European population. In particular, free movement can be an engine of Europeanness, 
but its horsepower so far has not been sufficient to act as a locomotive of further 
identitarian integration. Second, ideologically: because the stratified nature of intra-EU 
mobility and transnational practices (involving mostly the highly educated, young and 
more privileged strata of the population) generates an anti-mobility reaction in the most 
sedentary part of the citizenry. One of Kuhn’s finding mentioned above – which she 
appropriately terms “the Janus face” of expanding transnationalism32 – warns that a 
legitimacy crisis can also be triggered by unintended backlash effects of a more mobile 
world. Mobility can bring about a divide between an ever more globalized upper class 
and a comparatively localized mass resenting the lack of transnationally generated 
opportunities. This ‘local-cosmopolitan’ polarization, well known to classic American 
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sociology,33 may regain salience on a larger scale. Differences in social transnationalism 
lie at the roots of the politically relevant divide between ‘winners and losers of 
globalization’.34 In attitudinal terms, these may be mirrored in the emerging 
‘cosmopolitanism-sovereigntism’ ideological struggle that, around the theme of the 
permeability of nation-state borders, is supplanting the traditionalism-libertarianism 
dialectic in advanced societies.35 
Such tension is echoed in the ‘boundary work’ that permeates EU politics and that 
migration flows – especially when they reach an extraordinary intensity, as during the 
asylum-seekers’ crisis of 2015-2016 in Europe – magnify. Citizenship is inherently 
exclusive, and European citizenship makes no exception. Inflows of aliens reinforce the 
salience of the ‘us vs. them’ frame of political life in the populace, especially among those 
who do not share transnational practices themselves and who are the prime supporters of 
the “Fortress Europe” philosophy of migration policies.36 The less mobile are likely to 
accentuate mobility as an all-encompassing threat, ultimately willing to get away with all 
legal foundations to transnational behaviours – including the EU free movement regime. 
As the “local vs cosmopolitan” divide grows larger, reproducing the “winners vs losers 
of globalization” dialectic, free movement becomes an easy target for right- and left-wing 
nostalgics of an idealized, more protective, state-centred world. 
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